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Abstract
In this paper we employ state-space models to estimate the pass-through of oil
price changes to consumer prices for a large sample of countries from 1970 to
2017. By controlling for self-selection bias and endogeneity and allowing for
different responses to positive and negative price changes, we asses the differ-
ences between explicit inflation targeting (IT) countries and a control group.
Surprisingly perhaps, our results suggest that the pass-through is higher for IT
countries. Our main contribution is to show that these is mainly due to IT
countries having a significant higher pass-through than non-IT countries when
the oil price decreases: a 10% drop in oil price leads about a 0.11% drop in infla-
tion in ITers (of which 4pp are explained by the monetary regime). Importantly,
we show that adopting IT reduces the asymmetry of the pass-through. We run
several robustness checks and conclude that falling oil prices are more welcomed
by the central banks with an IT framework, in particular during deflationary
episodes or when inflation is above the target.
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Highlights:
• We estimate the impact of inflation targeting on the oil price pass-through to
domestic inflation using a large sample of countries from 1970 to 2017
• When oil price increases but inflation remains low, the pass-through is lower
in IT countries, consistent with conservative preferences
• When oil price increases and inflation is high, we do not find any difference
between IT and non-IT countries
• When oil price decreases, the pass-through is significantly larger in IT countries
• This is observed particularly during deflationary events or when inflation is
above target
• The asymmetric oil price pass-through to inflation may partly be explained by
monetary policy reactions
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1 Introduction
Understanding the link between oil prices and consumer prices is crucial for monetary
authorities attempting to keep inflation under control. It is no wonder, thus, that
oil pass-through (OPT from now on) has attracted considerable interest in recent
years. Several papers have improved our understanding on the subject by confirm-
ing that, historically, oil price swings and inflation have been positively correlated,
even though this relationship has varied widely across countries. In addition, it is
suggested that: i) the pass-through of oil price changes to prices has weakened since
the mid-eighties and ii) the effects of oil prices on inflation depends on the direction
of the changes in prices, the magnitude of the pass-through being greater when oil
prices rise than when they fall.
Indeed, it is proposed that improved monetary policy may account for a part of
the decline in the oil pass-through (see Otker, et al. (2009) or Choi, et al. (2018)).
In particular, the better conduct of monetary policy has increase credibility: by
better anchoring inflation expectations, an unexpected increase in inflation –due to
events such as oil price shocks– does not lead to a change in inflation expectations.
For instance, Hooker (2002) showed that oil prices contributed substantially to U.S.
inflation before 1981, but since that time the pass-through has been much smaller.
Similar results have been found for other advanced economies and for some emerging
market economies. The decline in pass-through is attributable to the reasons above
that explain how monetary policy may have helped create a regime where inflation
is less sensitive to price shocks. Following this strand of the literature, many stud-
ies provide evidence that the adoption of inflation target (IT) is associated with
an improvement in overall economic performance (Bernanke and Mishkin (1997);
Svensson (1997)) and has even attenuated the oil pass-through (Mishkin (2007)).
A more recent literature, however, finds that the inflation targeting regime is not a
major determinant of the degree of pass-through (see Choi, et al. (2018)).
Regarding the asymmetric OPT, the notion that upward cost shocks are passed
through faster than downward cost shocks is usually explained under a non-competitive
market framework. In particular, when the global oil price rises, domestic petroleum
enterprisers will increase their refined oils prices as soon as they can in order to main-
tain their regular profit margins and not to experience any losses. Since the refined
oils are inputs and the raw materials of a variety of industrial products, production
cost of several products will increase, pushing up producer and consumer prices (PPI
and CPI, respectively). On the contrary, when refiners or re-tailers experience a de-
cline in their input costs, they will do not rush to decrease accordingly wholesale or
retail prices, since they can take advantage of the additional profits they can make.
This means that the decline of PPI and CPI is also smaller too. This asymmetric
price adjustment, introduced first by Bacon (1991) to explain the UK retail gasoline
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market, is known as the “rockets and feathers’ effect”, because prices rise like a
rocket, but fall like a feather. Moreover, monetary authorities perceive differently
positive and negative oil prices shocks: whereas central banks may welcome falling
oil prices if they ease inflation and boost growth, they may be more reluctant to let
pass oil price boosts to producer and consumer prices.
In this paper we bring together these two strands of the literature by studying the
role of inflation targeting on the OPT. We adopt two alternative methodologies to
ensure the robustness of our results. First, we estimate by dynamic GMM a standard
pass-through equation that allows for different responses to positive and negative oil
price changes that we interact with dummy variables for inflation target. Second,
we estimate time-varying pass-through coefficients by means of state-space models.
We then test the predictions that IT has reduced the impact of oil price shocks
into inflation using a well-established empirical framework that allows to control
for endogeneity and self-selection bias, namely a propensity score matching (PSM)
methodology. We privilege this approach since, rather than putting forth yet another
empirical model for the inflation with interaction variables, the PSM methodology
allows to determine whether a treatment, i.e. inflation target, leads to different
outcomes than the absence of treatment, by matching treated observations with
control observations that share similar characteristics other than the presence of the
treatment. That is, we construct a counterfactual for the treatment, based on a set
of observable characteristics to guarantee that we are comparing the ”comparables”
(see Lopez-Villavicencio and Pourroy (2017)). Furthermore, we distinguish between
oil prices increases and decreases and contrast the results in each case. Finally, we
estimate different models and use several alternative definitions in order to ensure
the robustness of our findings.
Our empirical results shed new evidence regarding the impact of inflation target-
ing: contrary to conventional wisdom, economies with IT have a higher pass through
than economies without this monetary regime. However, our main contribution is
to show that this results holds only for oil price decreases. The fact that both oil
prices increases and decreases impact inflation in ITers reduces the asymmetry of the
pass-through. Indeed, a 10% drop in oil price leads about a 0.11% drop in inflation
in ITers (of which 4pp are explained by the monetary regime). Our results seem to
show that that IT countries always react to oil price increases while non-IT coun-
tries do react only when inflation is high, the cost of inflation being clearly higher
than the cost of a restrictive policy. On the contrary, decreasing oil price are used
mainly by IT central banks to reduce inflation and to bring it closer to the target.
A possible explanation for these results is that IT central banks pursuit a more sys-
tematic policy than non-ITs: they follow a Taylor rule, and respond systematically
and symmetrically to shocks, so the asymmetry of the PT is lower. In sum, falling
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oil prices seem to be more welcomed by the central banks with an IT framework, in
particular during deflationary episodes or when inflation is above the target.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in detail our
methodology. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 displays our estimation re-
sults obtained by both approaches. Robustness exercises are presented in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The econometric framework
Our model of the oil pass-through is based on the following generic specification:
∆pi,t = αi +
n∑
j=1
γj∆pi,t−j + β∆poili,t + θ∆ei,t + ρ∆yi,t + λ∆p
∗
i,t + εi,t (1)
where pi,t denotes consumer prices in period t for country i, poil is the international
price of oil, αi is a country fixed-effect, e is the nominal effective exchange rate, y is
the demand shifter, p∗ corresponds to a supply shock variable and ε is an independent
and identically distributed error term.1 Equation (1) is estimated using the dynamic
GMM methodology. All the variables are expressed in logarithms.
Note that in Eq.(1), the OPT coefficient, β, is assumed to be symmetric. To
analyze the asymmetric effects, we further decomposed price changes into its positive
and negative variations as:
∆poil+t =
{
∆poilt, if ∆poilt > 0
0, otherwise
; ∆poil−t =
{
∆poilt, if ∆poilt < 0
0, otherwise
were poil+t and poil
−
t represent an increase and decrease in the oil price, respec-
tively. Therefore, the asymmetric OPT equation is the following one:
∆pi,t = αi+
n∑
j=1
γj∆pi,t−j+β
+∆poil+i,t+β
−∆poil−i,t+θ∆ei,t+ρ∆yi,t+λ∆p
∗
i,t+εi,t (2)
The previous distinction between positive and negative changes is important for
at least two reasons. First, the impact on inflation is not necessarily of the same mag-
nitude for positive and negative changes. Second, oil price increases and decreases
are not perceived in the same way by monetary authorities. Indeed, traditionally,
most central banks admit that higher crude prices help boost inflationary pressures
1We include 4 lags of the inflation rate to better capture the observed inertial behavior of inflation
(inflation persistence) and to avoid underestimating the pass-through.
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in the near-term, possibly providing second-round inflationary effects and filtering
into higher inflation expectations. More recently, however, positive oil price shocks
are consider not as inflationary as they used to be, allowing a less aggressive mon-
etary policy response. On the contrary, falling oil prices are more welcome as they
could ease inflation – especially core inflation or expectations – in which case central
banks may respond with monetary loosening which, in turn, can boost activity.2
Since we are interested in the impact of adopting the monetary regime on the
ERPT, we further interact the change in oil prices with a dummy variable that takes
on the value one starting in the period in which the country adopted this inflation
target (and for all subsequent years), and zero otherwise. The model in this case is
the following one:
∆pi,t =αi +
n∑
j=1
γj∆pi,t−j + β
+∆poil+i,t + β
−∆poil−i,t + φITi,t
+ δ+(∆poil+i,t × ITi,t) + δ
−(∆poil−i,t × ITi,t) + θ∆ei,t + ρ∆yi,t + λ∆p
∗
i,t + εi,t
(3)
To provide a complete analysis, and in order to overcome endogeneity issues,
as a second exercise we allow for time-varying OPT coefficients that we use latter
to match observations with and without the monetary target. More in detail, by
employing state space models we estimate the oil pass-through coefficients for each
country and period of the sample. State-space models are based on the idea that we
can use the observations to estimate the underlying states, which are unobserved.
The usual oil pass-through equation with the observation equation and the state
equation allows the coefficient of pass-through to vary over time. Therefore, for
each country in the sample, we use the time series equivalent of Eq. (2), i.e. the
measurement equation, with the following OPT shift equation:
β+t = θ
+
t−1 + Cυt
β−t = θ
−
t−1 + Cυt (4)
where the OPT parameter β+t and β
−
t are time-varying and depend on an au-
toregressive term and υt ∼ N(0, Qt). The system (2)-(4) constitute our state-space
2Note that monetary authorities may also respond differently to demand and supply shocks in
oil markets. On the supply side, lower oil prices lead to a decline in the cost of production that may
be passed on to consumers and hence, indirectly, reduces inflation. The lower cost of production can
also translate in higher investment. On the demand side, a decline in oil prices raises consumers’
real income and leads to an increase in consumption and maybe inflation. See Kilian and Park
(2009) and Kilian and Lewis (2011).
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model. These type of models can be estimated using the Kalman filter recursive
algorithm, which is commonly employed in time-varying coefficient models. The
Kalman filter is a method for recursively obtaining linear, least-squares forecasts of
unknown coefficients conditional on past information. These forecasts are used then
to construct the log likelihood. More precisely, for each time t, the Kalman filter
produces a conditional expected state vector and a conditional covariance matrix;
both conditional on information up to and including time t.3
We next assess the effect of an explicit inflation target with propensity score
matching. Specifically, we properly control for endogeneity and self selection bias to
asses if countries that have adopted IT present a lower level of OPT than countries
that have not. Adopting an IT framework is not a random event. Due to self
selection bias, a difference in OPT between countries with IT and the other countries
could then be attributable to systematic differences in some variables between the
two groups of countries rather than the effect of IT adoption. Also, adopting an IT
framework may be seen as an endogenous choice (see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2001)). For instance, countries with histories of high inflation or expecting future
high inflation are more likely to have felt compelled to adopt IT. The finding that
OPT is associated with IT thus may not imply that IT causes the OPT. Therefore,
in order to ensure that the difference in OPT between countries faced with IT and
the other countries is attributable to the treatment itself (IT adoption), and not to
systematic differences in some variables, we employ the matching and propensity
score methodology that was developed precisely for the bias associated with this
type of estimation problem.
The idea behind the PSM approach is to determine whether a treatment leads to
different outcomes than the absence of treatment, by matching treated observations
with control observations that share similar characteristics other than the presence
of the treatment. Following the matching of observations, we assess the “treatment
effect” by measuring the difference in the OPT between the two groups. That is, we
see IT adoption as a “natural experiment,” so we seek to reestablish the conditions
of a randomized experiment where the IT adoption mimics a treatment.
In particular, let D be a binary indicator that equals one if a country has adopted
IT and zero otherwise. Also, let Y 1i denote the OPT for country i if the country
has adopted IT (i.e. if the country is in the treated group) and Y 0i if not, all other
characteristics of the country being equal. The treatment effect for country i can
be written as Y 1i − Y 0i , where one outcome is observed and the other one is the
counterfactual. We are interested in estimating the average treatment (ATT) effect
on the treated countries, that is:
3See Lopez-Villavicencio and Pourroy (2017) for further details.
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ATT = E[Y 1i |D = 1]− E[Y 0i |D = 1] (5)
Introducing the control group, we can write the average treatment as:
ATT = E[Y 1i |D = 1]− E[Y 0i |D = 0]− E[Y 0i |D = 1] + E[Y 0i |D = 0] (6)
where E[Y 1i |D = 1] and E[Y 0i |D = 0] are observed and E[Y 0i |D = 0]−E[Y 0i |D = 1]
is the selection bias. Hence, Eq.(6) can only be identified if this selection bias dis-
appears, i.e. if E[Y 0i |D = 1] = E[Y 0i |D = 0]. The PSM methodology deals with this
selection problem by pairing each treated observation with control observations that
are otherwise similar based on a set of observable characteristics, X. This requires
that the treatment satisfies the so-called conditional independence assumption. This
assumption states that, conditional on a vector of observable characteristics, the
variable of interest (the OPT) is independent of the treatment status. Conditional
on this vector X, the expected OPT in the absence of IT would then be the same
for paired countries, that is E[Y 0i |D = 1,X] = E[Y 0i |D = 0,X], and the bias would
disappear. Under this assumption then ATT effect is written as:
ATT = E[Y 1i |D = 1,X]− E[Y 0i |D = 0,X] (7)
In Eq. (7) E[Y 1i |D = 1,X] controls for the relevant set of characteristics, X. This
set should include variables that are co-determinants of both IT (the treatment) and
OPT (the outcome), and conditioning on all relevant variables may be a challenge.
To obtain ATT, we proceed in two steps. We first estimate the propensity score
by a benchmark logit equation explaining the likelihood of a country receiving the
treatment. To this end, we consider a number of potential structural, political, and
economic determinants of IT (or any other treatment).
We then use a matching algorithm to pair the observations based on observable
characteristics. Applying these matching methods requires that two hypotheses
must be satisfied. The first is the conditional independence assumption stating
that, conditional to the vector of observable variables X, the outcome variable is
independent of the IT adoption. The second is the common support condition,
which ensures that there is sufficient overlap in the characteristics of the treated
and untreated groups to find adequate matches.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
We consider a sample of 49 advanced and emerging economies that have and have not
adopted explicit, i.e. strict, IT between 1980 and 2017 Argentina, Australia*, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Brazil*, Canada*, Chile*, China, Colombia*, Czech Rep.*, Denmark,
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Estonia, Finland*, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary*, Iceland*, In-
dia, Indonesia*, Ireland, Israel*, Italy, Japan, Korea*, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia,
Mexico*, Netherlands, New Zealand*, Norway*, Philippines*, Poland*, Portugal,
Romania*, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Rep.*, Slovenia, South Africa*, Spain, Swe-
den*, Switzerland*, Thailand*, Turkey*, The United Kingdom* and The United
States. Therefore, from our 49 countries, 26 countries are ITers.4
The variables entering the estimation of the oil pass through are: (i) the consumer
price index (P ), (ii) the West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil price, (iii) the nominal
effective exchange rate defined as domestic currency per unit of foreign currency
(E, source BIS), (iv) the GDP (Y , source IFS), and (v) the OECD producer price
index as a proxy for supply factors (P ∗, source OECD).5 All the series are seasonally
adjusted. We work with the year-to-year differences of the variables expressed in
logarithm terms.
For the second step, namely, the PSM estimation, we work with annual data
in order to consider a broad set of variables that define an economy. We therefore
annualised the OPT found in the first step by taking the annual mean value of the
four quarters.
Regarding the variables related to inflation targeting, we use a dummy variable
IT that takes on the value one starting in the period in which the country adopted
this inflation target (and for all subsequent years), and zero otherwise. According to
Mishkin (2004) or Hammond (2012), a central bank has an IT framework if it full-
fills the five following criteria : 1) Price stability is explicitly recognized as the main
goal of monetary policy; 2) There is a public announcement of a quantitative target
for inflation; 3) Monetary policy is based on a wide set of information, including
an inflation forecast; 4) Transparency; and 5) Accountability mechanisms. For the
sake of robustness, we follow Rose (2007), Minea and Tapsoba (2014) and Balima,
Combes, and Minea (2017) and distinguished between Full-fledge (FF from now on)
and Soft starting dates of IT. The difference between the two dates captures the fact
that some central banks first adopted “soft or informal” IT (see Vega and Winkelried
(2005)), in which the central bank’s reaction, following a deviation of inflation from
its targeted level, is slower compared to its reaction under an explicit “full-fledged
or formal” IT. Consequently, soft IT are those dates declared by central banks
4Countries with an explicit IT framework are denoted with a star (*). Dates of adoption are
presented in Table (8) in the Appendix.
5Although exchange rate and oil price shocks have the advantage of being relatively easier to
quantify, it is more difficult to measure precisely other forms of foreign costs, since they are often
not directly observable. As a result, researchers proxy these costs from different sources: foreign
producer price index, foreign output gap, etc. We follow Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010)
and analyze the pass-through with Eq.(1), where foreign marginal costs are proxied by foreign PPI.
Our choice of averaging over OECD countries is justify by data availability as well as the share of
the OECD share of trade in total trade.
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themselves, while full-fledged IT starting dates are those considered by academia as
the genuine dates from which the central bank began meeting the required criteria
to be classified as an ITer. Our sources are Rose (2007), Roger (2009) and Minea
and Tapsoba (2014).6
The rest of the variables correspond to the controls that we use in the logit esti-
mations: inflation volatility, financial development (captured by World Bank broad
money series), exchange rate regime (using Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2017)
classification), and the share of fuel in imports and in energy consumption (by the
World Bank) are the set of variables entering the benchmark logit model for the
propensity score for inflation targeting. Appendix A reports the exact definition
and source of all the variables.
4 Results
In this section we present the results of the benchmark estimation (Eq.1). We fur-
ther expand our analysis to allow for an asymmetric pass-through and estimate the
impact of adopting inflation target. In the second part, we allow for time-varying
coefficients for the time series and present the difference in OPT by considering the
role of the adoption of an inflation target as a treatment to find suitable counter-
factuals to the actual targeters, i.e., using propensity score matching. Finally, we
conduct a detailed analysis related to different forms of IT.
4.1 Panel estimation
Table 1 presents the GMM pass-through coefficients of Equations (1) and (2). As
seen, the significant positive coefficient shows that changes in oil prices have a strong
effect on inflation in most cases even though this relationship varies widely across
countries.7
More precisely, we find that a 10% change in global oil inflation increases domes-
tic inflation by about 0.13% in average. However, looking at the results presented
in the third and fourth lines of the table clearly shows an asymmetric impact of oil
6Note that the definition of IT is quite restrictive. Indeed, for inflation targeters, price stability
is the main goal of central bank’s mandate. Therefore, the USA and countries at the EMU are not
consider as ITers. Indeed, the Fed has a dual mandate with two goals: price stability and maximum
sustainable employment. Moreover, until January 2012 the Fed had not announced a quantitative
target for inflation. The European Central Bank, in turn, has a hierarchical mandate that makes
price stability the primary objective. However, in the implementation of its policy, the ECB follows
a two pillar approach that focus on all information (real sector activities and monetary aggregates
developments) and not only on price developments.
7For completeness, we present in table 1 in the Appendix the results for each country of the
sample.
10
price movements: positive oil price shocks have a larger effect than negative ones,
the difference being statistically significant.
Table 1: Symmetric and asymmetric oil pass-through coefficients.
Coeff. (t-stat)
∆poil 0.013 3.97
∆poil+ 0.016 5.07
∆poil− 0.008 2.31
β+ = β− 0.118
Notes: (a) This table shows the dynamic GMM panel estimation
results of Eq. (1) and (2); (b) β+ = β− is the χ-test probability
for the Wald test.
Given this asymmetric aspect of the oil pass-through, we proceed to estimate the
effects of the IT monetary regime on the positive and negative changes of oil prices
by interacting the asymmetric coefficients with the IT dummy variable. Results,
presented in table 2, show that a rise in oil price increases domestic inflation inde-
pendently of the adoption of IT, the interaction variable with the positive change
not being significant. However, a drop in oil prices does not lead to a drop in infla-
tion in non ITers. Indeed, the non significance of the coefficient for negative changes
and its significance when interacted with negative changes indicates that the fall in
the pass-through occurs in this case only for countries with the monetary target.
Therefore, these values seem to indicate that ITers have a less asymmetric oil price
change pass-through to consumer inflation than non-ITers.
Table 2: Effects of IT on asymmetric oil pass-through.
Coeff. (t-stat)
∆poil+ 0.021 (4.16)
∆poil+ × IT -0.012 (0.58)
∆poil− 0.003 (0.58)
∆poil− × IT 0.019 (2.14)
Notes: This table shows the dynamic GMM panel estimation
results of Eq. (3)
4.2 Propensity score estimates
Our analysis would not be complete without controlling for self-selection bias and
endogeneity. Indeed, we need to isolate what is due to the monetary regime from
what is due to country specific characteristics. In order to do so, we now turn to
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the propensity score estimate. As long as we are aware of, this methodology has not
been used before to account for oil pass-through.
Once the symmetric and asymmetric time-varying oil price pass-through is cal-
culated using state-space models, it remains to asses the impact of adopting an
inflation targeting framework. As a first glance, Figures 1-3 in the Appendix show
the evolution PT coefficients and the date of the adoption of IT, when relevant.
For a more formal examination, using these coefficients, we next follow a three
steps procedure: first we compute the propensity score, then we match the propen-
sity score of the treated and control groups, last we compute the average treatment
effect.
The propensity score is obtained by estimating the probability of observing IT
for all the countries of our sample, using a logit model where IT is the indepen-
dent variable. To respect the conditional independence assumption, the propensity
score estimates should include the possible variables that may have a systematic
impact on the choice of adopting IT.8 We next proceed to verify that the inde-
pendence condition holds, i.e., that the value of various control variables does not
significantly differ between the treatment and control groups once the matching is
computed.9 The results using different matching algorithms, presented in table 3,
indicate that no significant difference remains in the data after completed the match-
ing procedures.10 We end-up with six exogenous variables that capture institutional
environment (Polity2 ), financial development (Money), inflation volatility (Inflation
Vol.), exchange rate regime (Regime), and the share of fuel in imports (Import) and
energy consumption (Fossil). Definitions and sources are presented in Appendix A.
4.2.1 Average treatment effect of Inflation Targeting on the pass-through
Having validated the first two steps (propensity score estimation and matching
treated and untreated observation), we estimate the impact of IT adoption on the
oil price pass-through to inflation. The average treatment effects (ATT) is presented
8Note that we estimate a logit model in order to orthogonalize a set of covariante variables into
a single dimension rather than to to explain IT. Hence, as opposed to a classic logit estimation, our
list of exogenous variables should not deliver the best statistical model to explain the probability of
IT adoption but rather it should be a set of variables that explains IT(with possibly some variables
that also have a systematic impact on OPT as well, since adopting IT may be endogenous to the
OPT) and respects the conditional independence assumption.
9During the matching step, we exclude data outside the “common support”, that is observa-
tions from the control group with PS lower than the minimum PS in the treated group as well as
observations from the treated group with PS higher than the maximum PS in the control group.
10The standardized percentage bias, i.e. the average gap between the Treated and Control group
expressed as a percentage of the square root of the sample variance, has been reduced by more than
80% due to the matching process, resulting in a bias after matching (R&R’s Residual Bias) of less
than 5%, which is small enough to accept the absence of conditional dependence.
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in table 4.2, using five matching algorithms. Standard errors are based on bootstrap
resampling with 500 replications.
Considering symmetric oil pass-through, the results in the table show that IT
significantly increases the PT: the average treatment effect (IT adoption) is positive
and significant.11 Indeed, depending on the matching algorithm and the control
variables considered, the increase is estimated to lie between 0.00129 and 0.00189
percentage points.12 This result may appear surprising because countries adopt IT
as a framework to keep inflation under control. Typically, a country adopts IT to
avoid that global shocks translate into large domestic inflation. This result may lead
us to conclude that IT does not deliver the expected results, and is not efficient in
stabilizing prices.
However, in order to avoid any premature conclusion, it is important to scrutinize
differences with respect to oil price increases and decreases. Our results in table
4 confirm that, faced with oil price increases, the existence of inflation targeting
regimes does not seem to be a major determinant of the degree of pass-through
(OPT+).13 In fact, our results reveal that the positive difference between ITers and
non ITers is entirely due to larger inflation decline in IT countries when the oil price
declines, the ATT being negative and significant in this case (OPT−). The average
treatment effect is around 0.004. In other words, while a 10% oil price falls leads to
a 0.11% consumer price decrease in IT countries, it would lead to a 0.07% consumer
price decrease in the same countries without IT. These results may suggest that
falling oil prices are more welcomed by the central banks pursuing inflation target.
Finally, it is worth noting that if IT makes the pass-through stronger when oil
prices fall, then it reduces the asymmetry of the PT. The asymmetry comes from
the fact that the PT on the rise is stronger than the PT on the downside, but for
the ITers the PT on the downside is higher than for the non-ITers. Consequently
the asymmetry is lower for ITers than for non-ITers. Let ai to denote the average
asymmetry between the estimated pass-through when oil price increases and when
oil price decreases. For a given country i we have ai = β
+
i − β
−
i . It can easily be
shown that the average treatment effect of IT on the pass-through asymmetry is
equal to the difference between the ATT when oil price increases and the ATT when
11For the sake of robustness, we estimate the average treatment effect for the “Soft IT” classi-
fication adoption date and we add variables related to the structure of the economy, the financial
sector or the fiscal position of the country while computing the PS index (see Balima, Combes, and
Minea (2017)). The estimated ATT in both cases are similar to the baseline estimation. All the
results are available upon request to the authors.
12In other words, while a 10% oil price change leads to a 0.13% consumer price change in IT
countries, it would lead to a 0.11% consumer price decrease in the same countries without IT.
13Based on a symmetric and static framework, Gelos and Ustyugova (2017) or Choi, et al. (2018)
present evidence that IT is not the main determinant for the OPT.
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oil price decreases: 14
ATT(a) = ATT OPT+ −ATT OPT− (8)
Based on results in table 4, adopting IT reduces the asymmetry of oil price change
pass-through to consumer inflation by about 40bps in average.
4.2.2 Explaining oil price PT to inflation when oil price increases
To understand what may be behind our previous results, we estimate the effect of
IT for different inflation levels. Results are presented in table 5.
Let us first focus on increasing oil price episodes. When inflation is lower than
3%, IT countries have indeed a lower pass-through than non ITers, the ATT being
negative and significant. However, when inflation is higher, IT and non-IT countries
have similar pass-through to inflation.
A possible explanation is that IT countries always react to oil price increases
while non-IT countries do react only when inflation is high. For example, when
inflation is low, non-IT countries may not want to react to oil prices by tightening
monetary policy, the cost of inflation being lower than the growth lost cost caused
by policy tightening. For an IT central bank, even at low inflation, oil price increases
may induce a deviation from the target and hence being costly enough (in terms of
credibility or more broadly preferences) to justify a tightening policy. However, for
inflation higher than 5%, there is no difference between IT and non-IT countries.
One possible explanation is that when inflation is high, all central banks react, the
cost of inflation being clearly higher than the cost of a restrictive policy. In other
words, our candidate explanation is based on preferences. IT central banks seem to
be, in average, more conservative than non-IT central banks: an IT central bank
may give an higher weight in their implicit cost function to inflation than do non-IT
central banks.15 To test this hypothesis, we estimate the average treatment effect
(ATT) excluding either the most conservative or the less conservative central bank.
Results are show in table 5.
14The average treatment effect (ATT) of the treatment (inflation targeting, IT= 1) relatively to
the control group (IT=0) on the oil price change pass-through to consumer inflation asymmetry
(ai =
1
T
∑T
t=1 β
+
i,t− 1T
∑T
t=1 β
−
i,t is equal to the difference between the ATT when oil price increases
and the ATT when oil price decreases:
ATT(a) =E[ai|IT = 1,X]− E[ai|IT = 0,X]
=E[(β+i − β
−
i )|IT = 1,X]− E[(β
+
i − β
−
i )|IT = 0,X]
=E[(β+i |IT = 1)− (β
+
i |IT = 0),X]− E[(β
−
i |IT = 1)− (β
−
i |IT = 0),X]
=ATT(β+)−ATT(β−)
15Most (least) conservative central bank are those ranked over (below) the median in the Central
Bank Conservatism index (cons) by Levieuge, Lucotte, and Pradines-Jobet (2019).
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Consistently with the explanation above, we find that most conservative IT cen-
tral banks, with a relatively higher preference for price stability than output, have a
lower PT than non-IT central banks: it is likely that conservative IT central banks
react stronger to oil price increases, hence reducing the pass-through to inflation.
Last, we find that the least conservative IT central banks have an average oil price
PT to inflation similar to non-IT central banks. These results seem to confirm that
the positive impact of being an IT country on non-IT oil price change pass-through
to consumer inflation, observed when inflation is low, is due to a more conservative
preferences by IT central banks, likely to imply stronger central bank reaction.
4.2.3 Explaining oil price PT to inflation when oil price decreases
Turning to decreasing oil price episodes, table 4 shows that, when oil prices decrease,
consumer prices decrease significantly more in IT countries than in non-IT countries,
the ATT for OPT− being close to 0.4 base points, in average.
A first explanation could be that decreasing oil price are used by IT central banks
to reduce inflation and to bring it closer to the target. To test this assumption we
divided our IT sample into three groups: i) inflation close to the target, ii) above
the target and, iii) below the target.16 Results display on table 6 seem to validate
this explanation. The positive effect of IT on oil PT is not observed when inflation
is below the target. In this situation, IT and non-IT countries are similar. However,
when inflation is close to the target or above, IT countries are more accommodative
to negative oil prices than non-IT countries.
A second explanation could be that IT central banks do not have the same
ability as non-IT central banks to tackle lowering prices. Typically, IT central banks
generally use the interest rate as their main policy instrument, while non-IT central
banks could be more incline to foreign exchange rate interventions, credit controls,
stock market operations, etc. Consequently, if the zero lower bound is seen as a
risk, IT central banks may appear less credible in their ability to face deflationary
pressures. To test this hypothesis, we consider that if IT central banks had not
the ability to respond to deflationary pressure, then there should be no impact of
central bank preferences on the pass-through. We show in table 6 the ATT excluding
from the sample central banks based on their preferences. We find that the most
conservative central banks have a lower ATT value than the least conservative. This
means that when central banks give a high weight to price stability, they can reduce
the impact of oil prices on inflation. Therefore, the positive ATT associated to IT
is not an ability issue but more about a wish.
Our third and last explanation could be that IT central banks have non strictly
symmetric targets : IT central banks react strongly when facing increasing price
16We considered inflation to be close to the target if it is within a 25% band around the target.
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(stronger than non-IT) but their answer is weak when facing decreasing prices
(weaker than non-IT) simply because they welcome negative price shocks. To illus-
trate this point, recall that IT was generally adopted at a time when high inflation
was much more a concern for central bankers than deflationary pressures. In the
recent years, ITers motivation to adopt IT was generally the opposite to the Fed:
when the Fed announced a 2% target in 2015, the purpose was to drive inflation up
to 2% and to avoid deflationary expectations by markets participants. Consequently,
the FOMC had to precise in 2017, when the target was almost reached, that it was
a symmetric target, and not a ceiling rate.17 The situation of most ITers is at odd:
they adopted a target as a commitment to price stability and in order to anchor
inflation expectation at a lower level than it used to be.18 Consequently, Roger and
Stone (2005) consider that IT starts with a “Disinflation Phase” followed by a “Sta-
tionary Inflation Target Phase”. One can thus think that ITers are compliant with
deflationary shocks, even if they drive inflation slightly below the target (the target
can subsequently be revised downwards). To test this hypothesis, we calculate ATT
excluding countries that experience IT for more than 3 years. Results are shown
in table 6 and are consistent with the idea that ITers are more likely to welcome
negative oil prices when they are still in the early stage of IT: the older the IT
framework, the lower the treatment effect (ATT).
5 Robustness
In this section we conduct a series of exercises to ensure the robustness of our results.
First, we changed in our benchmark PSM presented in Table 4 the measure of oil
prices. First, following Baumeister and Kilian (2011) we use the U.S. Crude Oil
Imported Acquisition Cost by Refiners (Dollars per Barrel) as a measure of world
oil price. Second, as suggested by Kilian and Park (2009) we estimate the main
equation with real oil price instead of the nominal one. The table also shows the
results when all the variables in Eq. (1) are lagged. As seen in table 10, our results
are robust in the three cases.
Moreover, in order to prevent our estimates from being distorted by the zero
17This appears in the Minutes of the Fed Meeting of March 14-15, 2017: “A few members ex-
pressed the view that the Committee should avoid policy actions or communications that might
be interpreted as suggesting that the Committee’s 2 percent inflation objective was actually a
ceiling. Several members observed that an explicit recognition in the statement that the Commit-
tee’s inflation goal was symmetric could help support inflation expectations at a level consistent
with that goal, and it was noted that a symmetric inflation objective implied that the Committee
would adjust the stance of monetary policy in response to inflation that was either persistently
above or persistently below 2 percent.” Minutes of the Meeting of March 14-15, 2017, page 11.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20170315.pdf
18Moreover, in many cases, a central banks’ mandate was only about “price stability”, the target
being a mean (and inflation targeting a framework) to achieve the objective of price stability.
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lower bound and the limits of the central bank to react in this case, we estimate
the models excluding the 2008-2017 period, i.e. after the Great Recession. Second,
we excluded the period 2014-2017. Indeed, following four years of relative stability
at around 105 dollars per barrel, oil prices have declined sharply since June 2014.
Even though it is not the first sharp oil price swing, it was accompanied by slowing
global growth, with lower oil prices cushioning, but likely not reversing, the growth
slowdown. As revealed in table 7, the main conclusions are quite similar for all the
sub-periods.
Additionally to the monetary goal, we could expect different reactions among oil-
importing and exporting countries. For instance, in oil-importing countries, lower
oil prices due to an adverse shock to the level of global economic activity, would
act as a gain in real disposable income for consumers, which in turn could be either
saved or spent, mitigating some of the negative impact of the initial demand shock.
On the contrary, adverse demand shocks that reduce the price of oil negatively
affect spending among commodity exporters. Moreover, an exogenous increase in
the supply of oil that reduces prices, however, would be expected to boost global
GDP in both producer and consumer countries. We therefore estimate the models
excluding oil exporters. Results in table 7 remain very close to the baseline.
Finally, it is suggested that energy subsidies are an important determinant of
the oil pass-through. In particular, according to Choi, et al. (2018), a country with
a high level of energy subsidy is likely to have a lower inflationary impact from
global oil price shocks. Moreover, an administered price system or price regulations
can also offer a mechanism to cushion the international price changes and achieve
domestic policy objectives on inflation (see Bhanumurthy, Das, and Bose (2012)).
We explore this possibilities by excluding countries with a large proportion of prices
are administered.19 As seen in table 7, excluding countries with energy subsidies or
administered prices does not change the ATT of IT.
19We rely on CEPII IPD measure (B4040) that includes a measure of direct commodity price
and gasoline subsidies. A country is assumed to have a large proportion of administered prices if
its score is greater than the median.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the role of inflation targeting in the relationship be-
tween oil price movements and domestic inflation. More in detail, we propose two
approaches to account for the role of IT on the pass-through. First, we interact
oil price changes with a dummy for IT. Second, we estimate varying coefficients
and consider the adoption of an inflation targeting framework by a country as a
treatment to find suitable counterfactuals to the actual targeters. In addition, we
allow for the possibility that inflation responds differently to price increases than
decreases.
Consistently with the literature, we find evidence of pass-through asymmetries.
Our main contribution is to show that the monetary regime has an impact on both
the pass-through and the asymmetry. By controlling for self-selection bias and
endogeneity, we show that the adoption of inflation targeting increases the pass-
through for oil price decreases and therefore reduces the asymmetry.
More precisely, our main results are as follow: (1) when oil price increases and
consumer inflation remains low, the pass-through is lower in IT countries, consistent
with conservative preferences; (2) when oil price increases and consumer inflation
is high, we do not find any difference between IT and non-IT countries; (3) when
oil price decreases, the pass-through is significantly larger in IT countries. This
is particularly observed during deflationary stages or when inflation is above the
target.
In sum, because IT is associated to a greater PT when the oil price falls, there is
an almost symmetric impact of oil price changes on inflation in these countries. For
instance, in both IT countries and non ITers, a 10% rise in the oil price increases
domestic inflation by 0.14%. However, a 10% drop in oil prices leads to a 0.11% drop
in inflation in countries following inflation target but only a drop of about 0.07% in
inflation for countries with the same characteristics but a different monetary regime.
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Table 3: Conditional independence assumption
Mean P-value (Treated = Control)
Treated Control
Nearest 1 Nearest 5
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor neighbor linear (.05)
Polity2
Unmatched 8.8651 8.0696 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Matched 8.8343 8.8677 0.926 0.890 0.843 0.926 0.863
Money
Unmatched 76.664 76.846 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945
Matched 76.237 76.422 0.489 0.433 0.967 0.475 0.947
Inflation Vol.
Unmatched .77422 6.4439 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165
Matched .77947 .75436 0.888 0.509 0.698 0.783 0.711
Regime
Unmatched 12.724 4.9935 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Matched 12.069 11.586 0.266 0.482 0.603 0.406 0.626
Import
Unmatched 12.159 13.672 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Matched 12.321 12.64 0.774 0.329 0.624 0.869 0.576
Fossil
Unmatched 71.318 79.288 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Matched 71.737 71.617 0.087 0.407 0.859 0.213 0.939
All variables
R&R’s Initial Bias 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9
R&R’s Residual Bias 5.3 3.4 1.9 4.1 1.8
R&R’s Bias Reduction 0.81 0.88 0.93 0.85 0.94
Rubin’s B 15.8 12.4 7.2 12.6 7.3
Rubin’s R 0.91 0.82 0.69 0.89 0.71
Notes: a) The difference between unmatched treated and control is the initial bias. The
difference between matched treated and control is, however, minimized during the matching
process. The absence of sample bias, i.e. the conditional independence assumption, is validated
by testing the difference between the variable average for the treatment group and the control
group. In the absence of bias, their should be not significant difference between the two groups
means –indicated by a large p-value; b) The R&R’s standardised percentage bias is the average
gap between the Treated and Control group expressed as a percentage of the square root of
the sample variance; c) The mean (Rubin’s B) or variance (Rubin’s R) are measures of the
average PS gap between the Treated group and Control groups. As a rule of thumb, the
balancing hypothesis is accepted for values below 25; d) Rubin’s R is the ratio the Treated
group propensity score (PS) index variance to the Control group PS index variance. The
acceptance threshold is generally assumed to be from 0.5 to 2 and is validated for our five
matching algorithms; e) The treated mean and control mean are reported only for the radius
matching algorithm. The balancing hypothesis relies on the covariante variables (polity2,
money, inflation vol., regime, import, fossil) and the treatment variable (inflation targeting
dummy). The output variable (oil price change pass-through to consumer inflation) has no
impact on this test, hence the results are the same for symmetric, positive or negative oil
pass-through.
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Table 4: Average treatment effect of IT on oil price change pass-through
to consumer inflation.
PSM
Nearest Nearest
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor(1) neighbor(5) linear (.05)
Symetric PT
ATT OPT 0.00238*** 0.00145** 0.00161*** 0.00150*** 0.00128**
T-stat. (2.76) (2.09) (2.62) (2.58) (2.27)
Treated/Obs. 341/1260 341/1260 341/1260 341/1260 341/1260
Increase in oil price
ATT OPT+ -0.000484 -0.000652 -0.000836 -0.00122* -0.00101
T-stat. (-0.47) (-0.82) (-1.02) (-1.66) (-1.45)
Treated/Obs. 309/1151 309/1151 309/1151 309/1151 309/1151
Decrease in oil price
ATT OPT− 0.00386*** 0.00385*** 0.00417*** 0.00410*** 0.00389***
T-stat. (4.24) (4.79) (6.01) (6.29) (5.82)
Treated/Obs. 340/1148 340/1148 340/1148 340/1148 340/1148
Notes: (1) Observed coefficient is treatment effect (the difference between the treated and
controls). When oil pass-through is lower for the controls than the treated, observed coeffi-
cient shows a positive value, (2) t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. Standard errors are
bootstrapped (using 500 iterations), (3) *,**,*** denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10%. A
high t-value indicates a significant gap between treated and controls, (4) Treated/Obs. is the
number of treated observations over the sample size.
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Table 5: Average treatment effect of IT on oil price change pass-through
to consumer inflation, when oil price increases
PSM
Nearest Nearest
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor(1) neighbor(5) linear (.05)
All IT central banks (recall)
ATT OPT+ -0.000484 -0.000652 -0.000836 -0.00122* -0.00101
T-stat. (-0.47) (-0.82) (-1.02) (-1.66) (-1.45)
Treated/Obs. 309/1151 309/1151 309/1151 309/1151 309/1151
Inflation up to 3%
ATT OPT+ -0.00342*** -0.00346*** -0.00331*** -0.00380*** -0.00329***
T-stat. (-2.72) (-3.67) (-4.60) (-5.77) (-5.11)
Treated/Obs. 147/989 147/989 147/989 147/989 147/989
Inflation up to 5%
ATT OPT+ -0.00203** -0.00224*** -0.00213*** -0.00255*** -0.00223***
T-stat. (-2.08) (-2.71) (-3.30) (-4.06) (-3.75)
Treated/Obs. 227/1069 227/1069 227/1069 227/1069 227/1069
Inflation up to 10%
ATT OPT+ -0.000789 -0.000820 -0.000945 -0.00134* -0.00108
T-stat. (-0.80) (-0.96) (-1.25) (-1.82) (-1.49)
Treated/Obs. 288/1130 288/1130 288/1130 288/1130 288/1130
Most conservative central banks only
ATT OPT+ -0.00236** -0.00200** -0.00236*** -0.00274*** -0.00208***
T-stat. (-2.13) (-2.07) (-2.96) (-3.50) (-2.93)
Treated/Obs. 158/1016 158/1016 158/1016 158/1016 158/1016
Least conservative central banks only
ATT OPT+ 0.000833 -0.000144 -0.0000897 -0.000394 -0.000846
T-stat. (0.61) (-0.12) (-0.08) (-0.37) (-0.87)
Treated/Obs. 136/994 136/994 136/9941 136/994 136/994
Notes: (1) Observed coefficient is treatment effect (the difference between the treated and
controls). When oil pass-through is lower for the controls than the treated, observed coeffi-
cient shows a positive value, (2) t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. Standard errors are
bootstrapped (using 500 iterations), (3) *,**,*** denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10%. A
high t-value indicates a significant gap between treated and controls, (4) Treated/Obs. is the
number of treated observations over the sample size. (5) Most (least) conservative central bank
are those ranked over (below) the median in the Central Bank Conservatism index (cons) by
Levieuge et al. (2019).
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Table 6: Average treatment effect of IT on oil price change pass-through
to consumer inflation, when oil price decreases
PSM
Nearest Nearest
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor(1) neighbor(5) linear (.05)
All IT central banks (recall)
ATT OPT− 0.00386*** 0.00385*** 0.00417*** 0.00410*** 0.00389***
T-stat. (4.24) (4.79) (6.01) (6.29) (5.82)
Treated/Obs. 340/1148 340/1148 340/1148 340/1148 340/1148
Inflation below target
ATT OPT− 0.00137 0.00150 0.00148** 0.00154** 0.000728
T-stat. (1.09) (1.62) (1.99) (2.00) (0.99)
NbrTreated 58/893 58/893 58/893 58/893 58/893
Inflation close to target
ATT OPT− 0.00349*** 0.00290*** 0.00315*** 0.00313*** 0.00285***
T-stat. (3.79) (3.83) (4.44) (4.60) (4.10)
NbrTreated 207/1042 207/1042 207/1042 207/1042 207/1042
Inflation above target
ATT OPT− 0.00603*** 0.00763*** 0.00801*** 0.00780*** 0.00735***
T-stat. (2.83) (3.91) (4.54) (4.63) (4.08)
NbrTreated 48/883 48/883 48/883 48/883 48/883
Most conservative central banks only
ATT OPT− 0.00273*** 0.00245*** 0.00298*** 0.00309*** 0.00281***
T-stat. (2.69) (2.68) (3.88) (4.27) (4.19)
Treated/Obs. 175/991 175/991 175/991 175/991 175/991
Least conservative central banks only
ATT OPT− 0.00421*** 0.00455*** 0.00469*** 0.00450*** 0.00441***
T-stat. (3.19) (4.10) (4.57) (4.59) (4.17)
Treated/Obs. 161/977 161/977 161/977 161/977 161/977
IT for less than 3 years
optn ATT 3yfirst 0.00426*** 0.00462*** 0.00444*** 0.00436*** 0.00409***
T-stat. (4.36) (5.31) (5.39) (5.17) (4.84)
Treated/Obs. 228/1022 228/1022 228/1022 228/1022 228/1022
IT for more than 3 years
optn ATT 3yold 0.00335*** 0.00394*** 0.00387*** 0.00382*** 0.00369***
T-stat. (3.88) (5.18) (5.61) (5.25) (5.52)
Treated/Obs. 314/1108 314/1108 314/1108 314/1108 314/1108
Notes: (1) Observed coefficient is treatment effect (the difference between the treated and
controls). When oil pass-through is lower for the controls than the treated, observed coeffi-
cient shows a positive value, (2) t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. Standard errors are
bootstrapped (using 500 iterations), (3) *,**,*** denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10%. A
high t-value indicates a significant gap between treated and controls, (4) Treated/Obs. is the
number of treated observations over the sample size. (5) Inflation is considered close to the
target if with-in a 25% band around the target. (6) Most (least) conservative central bank
are those ranked over (below) the median in the Central Bank Conservatism index (cons) by
Levieuge et al. (2019). (7) IT age is computed using “soft” adoption dates.
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Table 7: Average treatment effect of IT on oil price change pass-through
to consumer inflation, robustness
PSM
Nearest Nearest
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor(1) neighbor(5) linear (.05)
Baseline (recall)
ATT OPT+ -0.000484 -0.000652 -0.000836 -0.00122* -0.00101
T-stat. (-0.47) (-0.82) (-1.02) (-1.66) (-1.45)
Treated/Obs. 309/1151 309/1151 309/1151 309/1151 309/1151
ATT OPT− 0.00386*** 0.00385*** 0.00417*** 0.00410*** 0.00389***
T-stat. (4.24) (4.79) (6.01) (6.29) (5.82)
Treated/Obs. 340/1148 340/1148 340/1148 340/1148 340/1148
Excluding Great Recession area
ATT OPT+ 1970-2007 -0.000886 -0.00130 -0.00123 -0.00149* -0.00156*
T-stat (-0.57) (-1.21) (-1.45) (-1.81) (-1.81)
Treated/Obs. 150/992 150/992 150/992 150/992 150/992
ATT OPT− 1970-2007 0.00338*** 0.00357*** 0.00405*** 0.00393*** 0.00361***
T-stat (3.02) (3.60) (4.71) (4.65) (4.60)
Treated/Obs. 179/987 179/987 179/987 179/987 179/987
Excluding falling oil price area
ATT OPT+ 1970-2013 -0.000488 -0.000633 -0.000606 -0.00102 -0.000760
T-stat (-0.46) (-0.70) (-0.79) (-1.34) (-0.97)
Treated/Obs. 265/1107 265/1107 265/1107 265/1107 265/1107
ATT OPT− 1970-2013 0.00375*** 0.00378*** 0.00419*** 0.00412*** 0.00389***
T-stat (4.02) (4.38) (6.04) (5.76) (5.76)
Treated/Obs. 297/1105 297/1105 297/1105 297/1105 297/1105
Excluding oil exporters
ATT OPT+ -0.000732 -0.00103 -0.00109 -0.00137* -0.00137
T-stat (-0.67) (-1.12) (-1.37) (-1.65) (-1.63)
Treated/Obs. 240/1082 240/1082 240/1082 240/1082 240/1082
ATT OPT− 0.00381*** 0.00381*** 0.00411*** 0.00396*** 0.00383***
T-stat (3.98) (4.36) (5.34) (5.00) (5.23)
Treated/Obs. 277/1085 277/1085 277/1085 277/1085 277/1085
Excluding if a large proportion of consumer prices are administered
ATT OPT+ -0.00105 -0.001000 -0.00121 -0.00163** -0.00160**
T-stat (-0.86) (-1.00) (-1.57) (-2.15) (-2.21)
Treated/Obs. 196/1038 196/1038 196/1038 196/1038 196/1038
ATT OPT− 0.00353*** 0.00397*** 0.00422*** 0.00404*** 0.00398***
T-stat (3.04) (4.11) (4.81) (4.95) (4.94)
Treated/Obs. 225/1033 225/1033 225/1033 225/1033 225/1033
Notes: (1) Observed coefficient is treatment effect (the difference between the treated and
controls). When oil pass-through is lower for the controls than the treated, observed coeffi-
cient shows a positive value, (2) t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. Standard errors are
bootstrapped (using 500 iterations), (3) *,**,*** denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10%. A
high t-value indicates a significant gap between treated and controls, (4) Treated/Obs. is the
number of treated observations over the sample size. (5) A country has a large proportion of
administered prices if its Price Policy score (CEPII IPD database, reference B4040) is greater
than the median.
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Table 8: IT data-set composition
Country IT Soft IT Full-Fledge
New Zealand 1990 1990
Canada 1991 1992
Chile 1991 2000
Israel 1992 1997
Australia 1993 1995
Finland* 1993 1994
Sweden 1993 1995
United Kingdom 1993 1993
Spain* 1995 1995
Czech Republic 1998 1998
Korea Republic 1998 1998
Brazil 1999 1999
Mexico 1999 2001
Poland 1999 1999
Colombia 2000 2000
South Africa 2000 2000
Switzerland 2000 2000
Thailand 2000 2000
Hungary 2001 2002
Iceland 2001 2001
Norway 2001 2001
Philippines 2002 2002
Slovak Republic* 2005 2005
Indonesia 2005 2006
Romania 2005 2006
Turkey 2006 2006
Notes: The starting date is the current year of
adoption if it took place from January to June,
the following year if it took place form July to De-
cember. The ending date is 2016 for all countries
but Finland, Slovak Republic and Spain which
adopted the Euro in 1999, 2009 and 1999 respec-
tively.
A Variables and definition:
Central Bank Independence Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the country is
IT and has indepedence greater than median, according to Bodea and Hicks (2015),
Crowe and Meade (2007) and Garriga (2016b) indices . Source: Author’s calcula-
27
tions based on Garriga (2016a)
Central Bank Conservatism Index taking values from 0 to 1, greater values
are associated to more conservative preferences, defined as a preference for price
stability over output. Source: Levieuge, Lucotte, and Pradines-Jobet (2019)
Exchange Rate Variation (∆e): Quarterly year-to-year difference of the log
nominal effective exchange rate. Domestic currency per unit of foreign currency:
an increase implies a nominal depreciation.
Source: BIS- Bank of International Settlements
Fossil: Lag fossil fuel energy consumption (% of total) .
Source: World Bank (EG.USE.COMM.FO.ZS)
GDP Growth (∆y): Quarterly seasonally adjusted year-to-year difference of the
log GDP in real terms.
Source: IMF- International Financial Statistics
GDP Share: The share of world GDP (domestic current US$ GDP over world
current US$ GDP, %, )
Source: Author’s calculations & World Bank (ny.gdp.mktp.cd)
Import: Lag fuel imports (% of merchandise imports)
Source: World Bank (TM.V AL.FUEL.ZS.UN)
Inflation (∆p): Quarterly seasonally adjusted year-to-year difference of the log
consumer price index.
Source: IMF- International Financial Statistics
Inflation Targeting: Ful Fledged : Dummy variable that takes on the value
one if in a given year the country operates under IT, and zero otherwise. The de-
fault IT variable corresponds to the full-fledge definition: countries that make an
explicit commitment to meet a specified inflation rate or range within a specified
time frame, regularly announce their targets to the public, and have institutional
arrangements to ensure that the central bank is accountable for meeting the target.
Source: Rose (2007), Roger (2009) and Minea and Tapsoba (2014)
Inflation Targeting: Soft Dummy variable that takes on the value one start-
ing in the period in which the country officially announced the adoption of IT (and
28
for all subsequent years), and zero otherwise. Under soft IT, the inflation target
may coexists with other nominal anchors.
Source: Rose (2007), Roger (2009) and Minea and Tapsoba (2014)
Inflation Volatility: Lag standard deviation of the annualized monthly inflation
rates of years t and t− 1
Source: Author’s calculations based on the consumer price index provided by the
IMF- International Financial Statistics
Money: Lag money-to-GDP ratio (Broad money % of GDP) .
Source: World Bank (FM.LBL.BMNY.GD.ZS) and IMF IFS (35L..ZK)
Polity2: Polity2 index taking values from -10 (very autocratic) to +10 (very demo-
cratic) and constructed by subtracting the democracy score from the autocracy score
Source: Polity IV Project (Polity2)
Price Policy: The “Freedom of prices” index takes value from 1 to 5 based on
a measure of direct commodity price and gasoline subsidies.
Source: CEPII IPD database, reference B4040
Regime: Years since the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime
Source: Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2017), authors’ calculation
Supply Shocks (∆p∗): Quarterly seasonally adjusted year-to-year difference of
the average OECD producer price index.
Source: IMF- International Financial Statistics
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Table 9: Symmetric and asymmetric oil pass-through coefficients.
OPT: Symmetric PT Asymmetric PT
Country: β β+ β− β+ = β−
Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Prob.
Argentina -0.014 -1.61 -0.006 -0.46 -0.023 -1.78 0.195
Australia* 0.005 2.01 0.010 2.56 -0.001 -0.24 0.107
Austria 0.007 5.88 0.010 5.39 0.003 1.57 0.055
Belgium 0.009 5.81 0.013 5.43 0.004 1.54 0.033
Brazil* 0.006 1.32 0.011 1.91 -0.001 -0.22 0.177
Canada* 0.011 6.27 0.011 4.68 0.011 3.49 0.964
Chile* 0.007 2.52 0.011 2.35 0.003 0.51 0.304
China 0.001 0.27 -0.002 -0.35 0.005 0.75 0.468
Colombia* 0.004 1.50 0.008 1.91 0.000 0.07 0.234
Czech Rep.* 0.011 2.89 0.012 1.97 0.009 1.62 0.780
Denmark 0.007 2.92 0.016 4.71 -0.006 -1.50 0.000
Estonia 0.009 2.19 0.002 0.28 0.017 2.22 0.226
Finland* 0.008 4.18 0.011 4.12 0.002 0.76 0.039
France 0.008 5.64 0.012 6.06 0.002 0.90 0.003
Germany 0.004 3.98 0.003 1.82 0.007 3.04 0.023
Greece 0.007 1.76 -0.000 -0.09 0.018 2.27 0.049
Hong Kong 0.002 0.57 -0.002 -0.47 0.007 1.21 0.287
Hungary* 0.004 1.36 0.003 0.49 0.007 1.15 0.667
Iceland* 0.035 4.41 0.041 3.33 0.027 1.72 0.052
India 0.009 2.19 0.015 1.92 0.004 0.51 0.394
Indonesia* 0.023 1.85 0.027 1.21 0.020 0.91 0.835
Ireland 0.014 4.65 0.021 4.54 0.004 0.69 0.036
Israel* 0.001 0.33 0.001 0.12 0.002 0.28 0.925
Italy 0.009 4.91 0.017 5.00 0.002 0.45 0.012
Japan 0.008 3.21 0.015 3.74 -0.001 -0.17 0.030
Korea* 0.029 5.77 0.041 5.57 0.011 1.13 0.023
Latvia 0.005 1.48 0.006 0.84 0.005 0.80 0.963
Lithuania 0.005 1.34 0.007 0.99 0.003 0.41 0.203
Malaysia 0.007 2.29 0.005 0.96 0.010 1.96 0.479
Mexico* 0.024 2.14 0.024 1.47 0.030 1.41 0.828
Netherlands 0.008 4.16 0.007 2.09 0.009 2.47 0.744
New Zealand* 0.009 3.48 0.012 2.97 0.004 1.20 0.093
Norway* 0.006 2.34 0.013 3.81 -0.006 -1.31 0.002
Philippines* 0.009 2.06 0.005 0.56 0.015 1.89 0.442
Poland* 0.009 3.04 0.017 3.44 0.001 0.22 0.042
Portugal 0.007 1.43 0.009 1.24 0.004 0.34 0.684
Romania* -0.010 -0.32 -0.049 -0.92 0.032 0.57 0.363
Russia 0.007 0.90 0.040 3.76 -0.043 -3.03 0.000
Singapore 0.007 2.72 0.011 2.93 0.001 0.23 0.028
Slovak Rep.* 0.016 2.86 0.024 2.48 0.007 0.72 0.030
Slovenia 0.008 2.99 0.011 2.30 0.005 1.12 0.045
South Africa* 0.009 3.04 0.014 3.01 0.004 0.69 0.020
Spain* 0.007 2.61 0.011 2.78 0.001 0.08 0.006
Sweden* 0.013 5.13 0.016 4.11 0.010 2.13 0.461
Switzerland* 0.004 2.61 0.001 0.51 0.008 2.71 0.017
Thailand* 0.009 2.32 0.003 0.51 0.016 2.43 0.017
Turkey* 0.042 3.65 0.057 3.10 0.025 1.33 0.013
United Kingdom* 0.009 3.65 0.013 3.44 0.003 0.70 0.007
United States 0.013 6.87 0.018 6.75 0.007 2.18 0.008
Notes: (a) This table shows the coefficients the OLS estimation of Eq. (1) and (2); (b) ITers
are denoted with a star (*), (c) β+ = β− is the χ-test probability for the Wald test.
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Table 10: Average treatment effect of IT on oil price change pass-through.
Robustness test using alternative measures of oil and lagged variables in
the benchmark equation.
PSM
Nearest Nearest
Kernel
Local- Radius
neighbor(1) neighbor(5) linear (.05)
Alternative oil price series: U.S. Crude Oil Imported Acquisition Cost by Refiners
Symmetric PT
ATT OPT 0.00161** 0.000818 0.000940* 0.000873 0.00139***
T-stat. (2.42) (1.40) (1.80) (1.63) (2.87)
Treated/Obs. 301/1070 301/1070 . 301/1070 301/1070 301/1070
Increase in oil price
ATT OPT+ -0.000434 -0.000674 -0.000965 -0.00101 -0.00118
T-stat. (-0.38) (-0.75) (-1.14) (-1.23) (-1.38)
Treated/Obs. 271/1066 271/1066 271/1066 271/1066 271/1066
Decrease in oil price
ATT OPT− 0.00272** 0.00231** 0.00247*** 0.00231** 0.00238***
T-stat. (2.25) (2.34) (2.69) (2.55) (2.80)
Treated/Obs. 255/917 255/917 255/917 255/917 255/917
Alternative oil price series: Real price oil change
Symmetric PT
ATT OPT 0.00285*** 0.00182** 0.00209*** 0.00200*** 0.00153**
T-stat. (2.86) (2.38) (2.98) (2.94) (2.23)
Treated/Obs. 321/1190 321/1190 321/1190 321/1190 321/1190
Increase in oil price
ATT OPT+ -0.000586 -0.000147 -0.000349 -0.000642 -0.00114**
T-stat. (-0.77) (-0.22) (-0.68) (-1.22) (-2.04)
Treated/Obs. 255/968 255/968 255/968 255/968 255/968
Decrease in oil price
ATT OPT− 0.00301*** 0.00179** 0.00195*** 0.00221*** 0.00213***
T-stat. (3.37) (2.11) (2.63) (2.97) (3.16)
Treated/Obs. 228/884 228/884 228/884 228/884 228/884
Alternative equation: introducing lags
Symmetric PT
ATT OPT 0.00277*** 0.00123* 0.00145** 0.00123** 0.000842
T-stat. (3.21) (1.70) (2.42) (2.23) (1.46)
Treated/Obs. 319/1177 319/1177 . 319/1177 319/1177 319/1177
Increase in oil price
ATT OPT+ -0.000579 -0.00134* -0.00140** -0.00174** -0.00129**
T-stat. (-0.69) (-1.65) (-1.99) (-2.52) (-1.97)
Treated/Obs. 246/1052 246/1052 246/1052 246/1052 246/1052
Decrease in oil price
ATT OPT− 0.00384*** 0.00283*** 0.00309*** 0.00319*** 0.00241***
T-stat. (3.41) (2.98) (3.38) (3.59) (2.76)
Treated/Obs. 245/993 245/951 245/951 245/951 245/951
Notes: (1) Observed coefficient is treatment effect (the difference between the treated and
controls). When oil pass-through is lower for the controls than the treated, observed coeffi-
cient shows a positive value, (2) t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. Standard errors are
bootstrapped (using 500 iterations), (3) *,**,*** denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10%. A
high t-value indicates a significant gap between treated and controls, (4) Treated/Obs. is the
number of treated observations over the sample size.31
Figure 1: Oil Pass-Through to Inflation
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Figure 2: Oil Pass-Through to Inflation (cont.)
33
Figure 3: Oil Pass-Through to Inflation (cont.)
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